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ABSTRACT  
The Directorate-General Justice in the European Commission is working on a follow-
up to the 2012 Communication of the Commission on “A new approach to business 
failure and insolvency”1 and the 2013 public consultation on the same topic. Against 
this background a study has been commissioned to provide information on 
restructuring mechanisms already available in all Member States, their main 
features, effective use, rate of success, cost to the debtor and length.  
 
INSOL Europe, the Pan-European association of insolvency professionals, has 
gathered from its membership a team of experts covering all 28 Member States of 
the European Union, to provide a comprehensive but condensed report on the 
restructuring mechanisms currently available in the Member States jurisdictions. 
Where available, information on the actual application and the rate of success has 
been provided as well. The study reflects the legal situation in the Member States 
as of October 2013. 
 
The study provides the facts collected across the 28 Member States in an Annex 
and the report provides an analysis of this data, together with recommendations of 
the experts for an early preventive restructuring mechanism.   
 
The information and views set out in this study are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Commission. The Commission does not 
guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this study. Neither the Commission 
nor any person acting on the Commission’s behalf may be held responsible for the 
use which may be made of the information contained therein. 
 
………. 
 
La Direction générale de la justice de la Commission européenne travaille 
actuellement sur un suivi de la Communication 2012 de la Commission sur « une 
nouvelle approche européenne en matière de défaillances et d’insolvabilité des 
entreprises »1 et de la consultation publique 2013 sur le même sujet. Dans ce 
contexte, une étude a été commandée pour fournir des informations sur les 
mécanismes de restructuration déjà existants dans tous les États membres et sur 
les caractéristiques principales, l’efficacité, le taux de réussite, le coût pour le 
débiteur et la durée de ces mécanismes. 
 
INSOL Europe, l'association paneuropéenne des professionnels de l'insolvabilité, a 
réuni parmi ses membres une équipe d'experts couvrant l’ensemble des 28 États 
membres de l’Union européenne, afin d’établir un rapport exhaustif mais condensé 
sur les mécanismes de restructuration actuellement utilisés dans les États 
                                                 
1  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee “A new European approach to business failure 
and insolvency“, Strasbourg, 12.12.2012, COM (2012) 742 final.  
 
 Communication de la Commission au Parlement européen, au Conseil et au Comité 
économique et social européen « Nou-velle approche européenne en matière de 
défaillances et d’insolvabilité des entreprises », Strasbourg, 12 décembre 2012, 
COM(2012) 742 final. 
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membres. A toutes fins utiles, il donne également des informations sur l'efficacité et 
le taux de ré-ussite de ces mécanismes. L’étude reflète l’état du droit des États 
membres en octobre 2013. 
 
L'étude fournit dans une annexe les données recueillies dans les 28 États membres 
et le rapport en offre une analyse, auquel sont jointes les recommandations des 
experts sur l’établissement d'un mé-canisme précoce de restructuration préventive. 
 
Les informations et les vues énoncées dans la présente étude sont celles des 
auteurs et ne reflètent pas nécessairement l’opinion officielle de la Commission.  
La Commission ne garantit pas l'exactitude des données incluses dans cette étude. 
Ni la Commission ni aucune personne agissant pour le compte de la Commission ne 
peut être tenue responsable de l'usage qui pourrait être fait des infor-mations qui y 
sont contenues. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This report concerns a study of proceedings in the Member States aimed at 
rescuing companies in financial difficulties with an emphasis on early proceedings. 
It contains recommendations for minimum standards for proceedings in the pre-
insolvency stage or early stage of insolvency. The study reflects the legal situation 
in the Member States as of October 2013. 
 
This report has been submitted by INSOL Europe, the European association of 
insolvency professionals. INSOL Europe is an independent organization of lawyers, 
accountants, academics and judges specialising in insolvency law, which organises 
conferences, supports research, procures international cooperation and assists at 
developing standards in the areas of insolvency law and practice. 
 
………. 
 
Ce rapport a pour objet une étude des procédures d’insolvabilité des États 
membres dont l’objectif est de venir en aide aux entreprises en difficultés, et en 
particulier des procédures précoces. Il fournit par ailleurs des recommandations 
quant aux règles minima susceptibles d’encadrer les procédures dans la phase de 
pré-insolvabilité ou dans une phase précoce de l’insolvabilité. L’étude reflète l’état 
du droit des États membres en octobre 2013. 
 
Ce rapport est soumis par INSOL Europe, l’Association européenne des 
professionnels de l’insolvabilité. INSOL Europe est une organisation indépendante 
d’avocats, d’experts comptables, de membres universitaires et magistrats 
spécialisés dans le droit de l’insolvabilité dont la vocation est d’organiser des 
conférences, de soutenir la recherche, de fournir une coopération internationale et 
de contribuer au développement de normes dans le domaine du droit de 
l’insolvabilité et de sa pratique. 
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2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
 
This report, submitted by INSOL Europe, the European association of insolvency 
professionals, to the European Commission – DG Justice, provides a comparative 
overview of proceedings in the Member States aimed at rescuing companies and 
individuals in financial difficulties with an emphasis on early proceedings, as well as 
recommendations for minimum standards for proceedings in the pre-insolvency 
stage or early stage of insolvency. It also contains an overview of full insolvency 
proceedings. The study reflects the legal situation in the Member States as of 
October 2013. 
 
Different kinds of insolvency proceedings 
 
The uniform and/or shared definition of “pre-insolvency proceedings” poses a 
number of problems due to the differences and divergencies in the domestic laws of 
the Member States. The following considerations can be drawn: 
 
(a) rescue of businesses is typically carried out either through an out-of-court 
settlement, which is generally considered to be based upon contract law or 
corporate law, or a rescue/restructuring plan, or the sale of the assets to a 
new legal entity; 
(b) rescue of businesses may effectively take place in very different proceedings 
including full insolvency proceedings aimed at liquidation;  
(c) there is a great variety of cases in which (pre-) insolvency proceedings are 
opened, thus statistics are often not very meaningful;  
(d) the insolvency test differs in the Member States: the most common criteria 
for initiating full insolvency proceedings are the cessation of payments test 
(also called the cash flow or illiquidity test), and the balance sheet test. An 
important distinguishing feature between proceedings is that in some 
proceedings the establishment of a certain stage of financial difficulty is a 
requirement for the opening.  
Pre-Insolvency proceedings 
Pre-insolvency proceedings are proceedings opened because the debtor  
is in financial difficulties but without any prior insolvency test, they involve the 
applicability of special rules of insolvency law.  
 
a) Confidential procedures 
Typically the following types of proceedings can be distinguished: 
 
i. Proceedings in which the debtor tries to reach agreement with the creditors 
with the assistance of an expert or insolvency practitioner. Creditors may 
not be forced to accept a reduction or modification of their claims or a 
standstill period. The debtor stays in control of the proceedings. New debts 
entered into by the debtors do not enjoy advanced ranking in subsequent 
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insolvency proceedings. Transactions performed according to the agreed 
plan may not be set aside in case of subsequent opening of full insolvency 
proceedings. 
ii. Proceedings as under (i) but the court can order a stay of enforcement of 
certain debts or can order modification of debts such as postponement of 
their due date. Debts incurred under these pre-insolvency proceedings may 
enjoy advanced ranking in subsequent insolvency proceedings. These 
proceedings may serve as preparation for a rescue plan, which is not 
confidential.  
iii. Proceedings as under (ii) but with the possibility to adopt a rescue plan 
involving a vote by the creditors involved and binding upon such creditors. 
The court may subsequently cram down other creditors. Sometimes secured 
creditors are exempt from such cram down. 
b) Public pre-insolvency proceedings 
Public pre-insolvency proceedings are proceedings in which a supervisor / 
administrator / liquidator is appointed or which take place under the supervision of 
a court and which are opened without an insolvency test. The opening of these 
proceedings is public. 
 
Two types of public pre-insolvency proceedings can be distinguished: 
 
i. Public pre-insolvency proceedings which serve as a first phase of insolvency 
proceedings for assessing the requirements for opening full proceedings. The 
insolvency plan (or the restructuring plan were available) has to be 
approved by the court, that is vested with differing levels of control. 
ii. Public pre-insolvency proceedings may also serve as a means to reaching an 
agreement with creditors. In case of failure, full insolvency proceedings are 
opened. The debtor may remain in possession, but an administrator is 
appointed by the court. The agreement has to be approved by variable 
majorities of creditors, but after approval or confirmation by the court it 
binds all creditors. 
Full insolvency proceedings  
Full insolvency proceedings are opened after the insolvency test has been carried 
out and the court has determined that the debtor is insolvent. They are either 
debtor-in-possession proceedings as defined below or proceedings conducted by a 
liquidator. 
 
Debtor-in-possession proceedings (DIP) 
Debtor in possession proceedings are pre-insolvency proceedings or full insolvency 
proceedings in which the debtor is not divested of the assets but administers his 
assets under supervision by a court or a court appointed supervisor. They are 
designed to avoid liquidation and facilitate restructuring.  
 
Several models can be followed, which may be alternative to one another: 
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(a) a reorganisation plan voted on by the creditors and confirmed by the court, 
sometimes accompanied by a short moratorium; 
(b) a moratorium ending with an agreement, that may be carried out under the 
supervision of the court and implies a stay of enforcement for claims 
covered by the agreement, which provides effects if the company complies 
with the collective agreement. 
If these scenarios fail, the proceedings may end up in a reorganisation through 
sales ordered by the court under a judicial administrator. 
 
Elements of pre-insolvency proceedings 
 
Commencement of proceedings 
In general  
 
(a) confidential proceedings can only be opened at the request of the debtor and 
usually involve an opening decision by the court. 
(b) public pre-insolvency proceedings may be started by the debtor, or by 
creditors, or by the liquidator by national agencies or public bodies. 
(c) Full insolvency proceedings including DIP insolvency proceedings are 
generally opened by the court upon request by the debtor only or by the 
debtor, a creditor, the liquidator or a public authority or agency. 
The opening of confidential and public pre-insolvency proceedings is conditional 
upon a certain level of financial difficulties, without this being subject to a prior 
insolvency test by the court. 
 
As far as full insolvency proceedings are concerned, in almost all Member States 
the cessation of payments (illiquidity) test is applied. 
 
Is the debtor left in possession? 
(a) In confidential proceedings the debtor is always left in possession of the 
assets. Sometimes a supervisor is appointed.  
(b) In the majority of cases where the public pre-insolvency proceedings serve 
as a first phase of insolvency proceedings an insolvency practitioner is 
appointed by the court, who supervises the debtor’s activities. Where the 
public pre-insolvency proceedings serve as a means of reaching an 
agreement with creditors the debtor may remain in possession, but a 
supervisor is usually appointed by the court. 
(c) In DIP insolvency proceedings the debtor is not completely free to manage 
the company, even after a restructuring plan has been approved and is 
implemented.  
(d) In full insolvency proceedings the debtor remains in possession only in 
rescue proceedings and debt relief, and not in the case of a final liquidation. 
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Stay of enforcement 
(a) In confidential proceedings enforcement can be stayed with respect to 
specific creditors who are made aware of the confidential proceedings.  
(b) During public pre-insolvency proceedings in some Member States full stay of 
individual enforcement and pending actions apply. Secured creditors are 
usually excluded from the stay. In some Member States provisional 
measures to secure the assets may be or have to be adopted by the court, 
depending upon the applicant. 
(c) In full insolvency proceedings in almost all Member States there is an 
automatic stay of individual enforcement and pending actions. 
Cram down on dissenting creditors 
(a) In confidential proceedings restructuring plans involving voting and cram 
down are rare and anyway limited to the creditors involved.  
(b) A composition in public pre-insolvency proceedings has to be approved by 
variable majorities of creditors, but after approval or confirmation by the 
court it binds all creditors. 
(c) In full insolvency proceedings, including DIP proceedings the plan may 
involve all creditors or only classes of creditors. The majorities for the 
approval of the plan vary from one Member State to the other. The plan may 
bind all creditors, irrespective of their approval and be subject to 
confirmation by the court. 
New finance 
(a) Granting superpriority to new financing in confidential proceedings is 
exceptional.  
(b) In general, in public pre-insolvency proceedings which serve as interim 
proceedings no superpriority is granted to new financing, however in public 
pre-insolvency proceedings which serve as a means to reaching an 
agreement with creditors superpriority is sometimes granted to new 
financing.  
(c) In DIP proceedings which are full insolvency proceedings superpriority is the 
rule.  
(d) In non-DIP full insolvency proceedings superpriority is granted in many 
Member States. 
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Court involvement 
(a) Court involvement is usually rather limited in confidential proceedings and in 
public pre-insolvency proceedings and full insolvency proceedings involving 
the appointment of a supervisor.  
(b) In DIP proceedings without supervision by a supervisor the court has to play 
a more active role. 
Confidentiality 
(a) Confidential proceedings can only be kept confidential provided (i) there are 
no prejudicial effects to creditors or (ii) with respect to creditors who are 
affected by e.g. a specific stay, the proceedings are disclosed.  
(b) The decisions opening DIP proceedings are usually public, even if some 
elements of the restructuring plan may remain confidential. 
Costs and length 
(a) The expenses of confidential proceedings vary considerably. Proceedings are 
fast in themselves or may be subject to time limits. 
(b) In public pre-insolvency proceedings court costs are very low in many 
Member States, in particular in Eastern Europe, while the lawyers’ fees for 
assisting the debtor or the creditors may vary considerably. The duration of 
interim proceedings varies considerably, from two months to 8-12 months, 
while public pre-insolvency proceedings as a means to reaching an 
agreement with creditors are usually faster.   
(c) DIP proceedings are rather swift and simplified, but costs are reported high. 
(d) The length of full insolvency proceedings varies considerably. In a large 
number of Member States the average length is two to three years.  
Incentives and success 
(a) Confidential proceedings often entail the exemption from voidability of 
transactions that have taken place during such proceedings, together with 
confidentiality. It is difficult to draw conclusions on the success of these 
proceedings from statistical data.  
(b) As concerns public pre-insolvency proceedings, in several Member States 
early filing is encouraged through civil and/or criminal sanctions. The 
success of these proceedings depends upon their scope. 
Recommendations for preventive pre-insolvency proceedings 
 
Confidential proceedings 
Confidentiality may reduce the risk that the continuation of the business is 
threatened if the value is decreased as a result of the insolvency stigma. By nature 
these proceedings cannot prejudice the rights of creditors who are not made aware 
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of the proceedings in any significant way, but where a stay or standstill and 
advanced ranking of debts incurred during these proceedings are provided, they 
stand a better chance of success. It should be considered whether power to order 
such stay should include a stay of claims of the creditor against third parties as co-
debtors and under guarantees. The possibility to have a rescue plan that is voted 
on by selected creditors only and which can be crammed down on the minority of 
dissenters may also provide an important tool. Other important tools may be a 
court established moratorium with respect to specific creditors, the possibility to 
provide priority status to new financing and protection against avoidance actions of 
transactions which have been concluded in the confidential proceedings with the 
consent of a court appointed supervisor or the court itself. 
 
The confidential pre-insolvency proceedings should be categorised as proceedings 
under the revised Insolvency Regulation, to be adopted at the centre of main 
interests (COMI) of the debtor. Two problems arise in this respect: (i) such 
determination of the COMI by the court should be subject to appeal by any 
Interested parties. However, creditors may not know of their opening or may hear 
about the confidential proceedings at different times; (ii) the determination of the 
COMI covers the duration of the confidential proceedings and does not preclude 
another COMI determination by a court in another Member State in relation to the 
opening of public pre-insolvency or full insolvency proceedings. In that case the 
decisions taken during the confidential proceedings and the consequences of such 
proceedings should remain effective.  
 
Public pre-insolvency proceedings may be cost saving, because they can be 
conducted before an insolvency test has been carried out. They may also create a 
creditor controlled kind of proceedings which may save costs as well. 
 
We do not see means specifically aimed at reducing costs.  
 
To the extent insolvency proceedings are perceived as lengthy, duration may be 
reduced by imposing deposit funds in escrow for creditors who may claim unfair 
treatment. 
 
Debtor in possession 
Debtor in possession proceedings are attractive, since they allow the debtor to 
retain control, although under some kind of supervision. However, such 
proceedings may be rather costly as they usually require the appointment of an 
experienced chief restructuring officer or court involvement at a much higher level 
than proceedings in which an independent bankruptcy trustee is appointed. Such 
level of court involvement may not be easily achievable in all Member States. 
 
Cram down 
Rescue of companies may be served by the adoption of rescue plans in which all 
creditors (including secured creditors), can be crammed down, provided qualified 
majorities of creditors with parallel interests vote in favour of such plan. Rescue 
plans should at least meet the requirement that the creditors receive under the 
plan at least the value that they would receive in the absence of such plan. 
Moreover there should be the possibility to have limited rescue plans involving only 
specific creditors which can be adopted in confidential proceedings. These limited 
plans should contain similar voting and cram down rules.  
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Stay of enforcement 
The courts should have the ability to order a stay of enforcement for a limited time 
against all or specific creditors. A standstill may be needed to deleverage creditors 
who may threaten to blow up the rescue of the company if they do not get more 
than their fair share. 
 
New finance 
The possibility to attract new loans during insolvency proceedings or pre-insolvency 
proceedings is crucial for the success of a rescue operation. New lenders should get 
some kind of priority ranking and protection against avoidance actions or 
subordination.  
 
Pre-insolvency proceedings and avoidance 
In order to enable pre insolvency proceedings to result in a successful rescue often 
payments of essential creditors have to be made and new transactions have to be 
entered into, sometimes involving the sale of part of the assets. Such transactions 
should be protected in subsequent full insolvency proceedings, provided they have 
been scrutinized by the supervisor or the court. 
 
Supporting measures 
In order to assure the effectiveness of an early rescue mechanism, it is imperative 
to implement measures safeguarding that trading of the debtor can continue 
unimpaired. The rights of creditors to terminate contracts or to request changes to 
existing contracts solely based on the fact that the debtor is making use of the 
rescue mechanism, although the debtor meets all contractual obligations, must be 
disallowed. Furthermore any contractual obligation to inform the other party of the 
opening of confidential proceedings should be disallowed as well. 
 
………. 
 
Introduction 
 
Ce rapport, soumis par l’Association européenne des professionnels de l’insolvabilité 
(INSOL Europe) à la Direction Générale de la Commission européenne, a pour objet 
de comparer les procédures d’insolvabilité des États membres dont l’objectif est de 
venir en aide aux entreprises et aux personnes ayant des difficultés financières, et 
en particulier les procédures précoces. Il fournit par ailleurs des recommandations 
quant aux règles minima susceptibles d’encadrer les procédures dans la phase de 
pré-insolvabilité ou dans une phase précoce de l’insolvabilité. Il contient également 
un aperçu des procédures formelles d’insolvabilité. L’étude reflète l’état du droit des 
États membres en octobre 2013. 
 
Différents types de procédures d’insolvabilité 
 
La définition uniforme et/ou partagée de la « procédure de pré-insolvabilité » pose 
un certain nombre de problèmes compte tenu des divergences entre les différentes 
législations des États membres. Les considérations suivantes ont été retenues : 
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(a) Le sauvetage des entreprises est généralement réalisé soit par un accord 
extrajudiciaire sur le fondement du droit des contrats ou du droit des 
sociétés, ou par un plan de sauvetage/ restructuration ou par la vente des 
actifs à une nouvelle entité juridique ; 
(b) Le sauvetage des entreprises peut effectivement avoir lieu dans le cadre de 
procédures très différentes, y compris dans le cadre d’une procédure 
formelle d’insolvabilité dont l’objectif est la liquidation ;  
(c) Il existe une grande variété de cas pour lesquels une procédure de (pré)-
insolvabilité est ouverte ; les statistiques étant souvent peu éloquentes sur 
ce point ;  
(d) Le test d’insolvabilité diffère d’un État Membre à l’autre : les critères le plus 
souvent retenus pour l’ouverture d’une procédure formelle d’insolvabilité 
sont la cessation des paiements (également appelée le test des flux de 
trésorerie ou le test d’illiquidité) et le test du bilan. Les procédures se 
distinguent notamment par le fait que certaines d’entre elles requièrent la 
constatation d’un certain niveau de difficultés financières pour l’ouverture de 
la procédure.  
Procédures de pré-insolvabilité 
Les procédures de pré-insolvabilité sont des procédures qui sont ouvertes en raison 
des difficultés financières du débiteur sans être accompagnées toutefois d’un test 
d’insolvabilité préalable. Elles sont fondées sur l’applicabilité de règles spécifiques 
de la législation sur l’insolvabilité.  
 
a) Procédures confidentielles 
D’une manière générale, on distingue les procédures suivantes : 
 
i. La procédure au cours de laquelle le débiteur essaie de parvenir à un accord 
avec les créanciers avec l’assistance d’un expert ou d’un syndic. Les 
créanciers ne sont pas obligés d’accepter une réduction ou une modification 
de leurs droits ou un moratoire. Le débiteur conserve le contrôle de la 
procédure. Les nouvelles dettes contractées par le débiteur ne jouissent pas 
d’un rang prioritaire dans le cadre d’une procédure d’insolvabilité ultérieure. 
Les transactions réalisées selon le plan convenu peuvent ne pas être 
utilisées si une procédure d’insolvabilité formelle est ouverte. 
ii. La procédure visée en (i), sauf que le tribunal peut ordonner un sursis 
d’exécution de certaines dettes ou une modification des dettes, par exemple 
le report de leur échéance. Les dettes engagées pendant la procédure de 
pré-insolvabilité peuvent bénéficier d’un rang prioritaire lors d’une procédure 
d’insolvabilité ultérieure. Cette procédure peut avoir pour but la préparation 
d’un plan de restructuration, qui n’est pas confidentiel.  
iii. La procédure visée en (ii), mais avec la possibilité d’adopter un plan de 
restructuration avec le vote des créanciers concernés qui les engage. Le 
tribunal peut ensuite imposer l’exécution de ce plan à d’autres créanciers. 
Parfois, les créanciers garantis sont exemptés de cette mesure. 
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b) Procédures publiques de pré-insolvabilité 
Les procédures publiques de pré-insolvabilité sont des procédures qui requièrent la 
nomination d’un superviseur / administrateur / liquidateur, ou des procédures qui 
ont lieu sous la supervision d’un tribunal, et dont l’ouverture ne demande pas de 
procéder à un test d’insolvabilité. L’ouverture de ces procédures est publique. 
 
On distingue deux types de procédures publiques de pré-insolvabilité : 
 
i. Les procédures publiques de pré-insolvabilité qui servent de phase 
préliminaire à une procédure d’insolvabilité afin d’évaluer les conditions 
nécessaires à l’ouverture d’une procédure formelle. Le plan d’insolvabilité 
(ou le plan de restructuration si disponible) doit être approuvé par le 
tribunal, dont le niveau de contrôle varie. 
ii. Les procédures publiques de pré-insolvabilité qui peuvent également servir 
de moyen pour parvenir à un accord avec les créanciers. En cas de 
défaillance, la procédure formelle d’insolvabilité est ouverte. Le débiteur 
conserve la possession (des actifs), mais un syndic est désigné par le 
tribunal. L’accord doit être approuvé à des majorités divergentes des 
créanciers. Une fois approuvé ou confirmé par le tribunal, l’accord engage 
tous les créanciers. 
Procédures formelles d’insolvabilité  
Les procédures formelles d’insolvabilité sont ouvertes une fois que le test 
d’insolvabilité a été effectué et que le tribunal a déterminé que le débiteur est 
insolvable. La procédure ouverte est soit une procédure de « débiteur non dessaisi 
» telle que définie ci-après soit une procédure conduite par un liquidateur. 
 
Procédures de «débiteur non dessaisi» (DIP en anglais) 
Les procédures de « débiteur non dessaisi » sont des procédures publiques de pré-
insolvabilité ou des procédures formelles d’insolvabilité dans lesquelles le débiteur 
n’est pas dessaisi de ses actifs, mais les gère sous la supervision d’un tribunal ou 
d’un superviseur nommé par le tribunal. Elles visent à éviter la liquidation et 
faciliter la restructuration.  
 
Il s’ensuit différents modèles susceptibles de se substituer les uns aux autres : 
 
(a) Un plan de réorganisation voté par les créanciers et confirmé par le tribunal, 
accompagné parfois d’un court moratorium ; 
(b) Un moratorium aboutissant à un accord qui peut être obtenu sous la 
supervision du tribunal et entraînant une suspension des clauses de l’accord 
qui produit ses effets si la société exécute l’accord collectif. 
Si ces scénarios échouent, la procédure peut se terminer par un redressement 
moyennant la vente ordonnée par le tribunal et régie par un administrateur 
judiciaire. 
 
 
Study on a new approach to business failure and insolvency – 
Comparative legal analysis of the Member States’ relevant 
provisions and practices 
 
 
 
 
 
12/05/2014  Page 15 of 44 
 
Éléments d’une procédure de pré-insolvabilité 
 
Ouverture de la procédure 
Généralités  
 
(a) La procédure confidentielle ne peut être ouverte qu’à la demande du 
débiteur et impliquent généralement une décision d’ouverture par le 
tribunal. 
(b) La procédure publique de pré-insolvabilité peut être engagée soit par le 
débiteur, soit par les créanciers, soit par le liquidateur, soit par des 
organismes nationaux ou publics. 
(c) La procédure formelle d’insolvabilité, incluant la procédure du « débiteur non 
dessaisi », est généralement ouverte par le tribunal à la demande du 
débiteur uniquement ou par le débiteur, un créancier, le liquidateur ou une 
autorité ou un organisme public. 
L’ouverture d’une procédure confidentielle et publique de pré-insolvabilité requiert 
la présence d’un certain niveau de difficultés financières, sans toutefois 
s’accompagner d’un test d’insolvabilité par le tribunal. 
 
S’agissant des procédures formelles d’insolvabilité, le test de cessation des 
paiements (illiquidité) est appliqué dans presque tous les États membres. 
 
Le débiteur conserve-t-il la disposition et gestion de ses actifs? 
(a) Dans une procédure confidentielle, le débiteur conserve toujours la 
disposition et la gestion de ses actifs. Un superviseur est parfois nommé. 
(b) Dans la majorité des cas où une procédure publique de pré-insolvabilité sert 
de phase préliminaire à la procédure d’insolvabilité, un syndic est nommé 
par le tribunal et supervise les activités du débiteur. Lorsque la procédure 
publique de pré-insolvabilité sert de moyen pour parvenir à un accord avec 
les créanciers, le débiteur peut conserver la disposition et la gestion de ses 
actifs, mais un superviseur est habituellement désigné par le tribunal. 
(c) Dans une procédure du « débiteur non dessaisi », le débiteur n’est pas 
totalement libre de gérer l’entreprise, même après approbation et mise en 
œuvre d’un plan de restructuration. 
(d) Dans une procédure formelle d’insolvabilité, le débiteur conserve la 
disposition et la gestion de ses actifs seulement dans le cadre d’une 
procédure de sauvetage/restructuration et de remise de dettes, mais pas 
dans le cas d’une liquidation définitive. 
Suspension des poursuites 
(a) Dans une procédure confidentielle, l’exécution peut être suspendue à l’égard 
de certains créanciers qui sont informés de la procédure confidentielle. 
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(b) Au cours d’une procédure publique de pré-insolvabilité ouverte dans certains 
États membres, la pleine suspension des poursuites et des procédures en 
cours s’appliquent. Les créanciers garantis sont généralement exclus de la 
suspension. Dans certains États membres, des mesures provisoires visant à 
garantir les actifs peuvent ou pourront être adoptées par le tribunal, en 
fonction du demandeur. 
(c) Dans la procédure formelle d’insolvabilité, les poursuites et les procédures 
en cours sont automatiquement conservées dans presque tous les États 
membres. 
Plan de redressement (cram down) pour les créanciers dissidents 
(a) Dans une procédure confidentielle, les plans de restructuration prévoyant un 
vote et un cram down sont rares et, de toute façon, limités aux créanciers 
concernés. 
(b) Un arrangement dans le cadre d’une procédure publique de pré-insolvabilité 
doit être approuvé à une majorité des créanciers qui varie. Après 
approbation ou confirmation par le tribunal, il engage tous les créanciers. 
(c) Dans une procédure formelle d’insolvabilité, incluant la procédure du « 
débiteur non dessaisi », le plan peut faire participer tous les créanciers ou 
seulement certaines catégories de créanciers. La majorité pour l’approbation 
du plan varie d’un État membre à l’autre. Le plan peut engager tous les 
créanciers, indépendamment de leur approbation et être soumis à la 
confirmation du tribunal. 
Nouveaux financements 
(a) Dans une procédure confidentielle, il est exceptionnel d’accorder un privilège 
à de nouveaux financements. 
(b) En général, dans une procédure publique de pré-insolvabilité servant de 
procédure provisoire, aucun privilège n’est accordé aux nouveaux 
financements. Toutefois, dans une procédure publique de pré-insolvabilité 
servant de moyen pour parvenir à un accord avec les créanciers, un privilège 
est parfois accordé aux nouveaux financements. 
(c) Dans une procédure du « débiteur non dessaisi », qui est une procédure 
formelle d’insolvabilité, le privilège est la règle. 
(d) débiteur non dessaisi », un privilège est accordé dans beaucoup d’États 
membres. 
Intervention du tribunal 
(a) L’intervention du tribunal est généralement assez limitée dans une 
procédure confidentielle, une procédure publique de pré-insolvabilité et une 
procédure formelle d’insolvabilité prévoyant la nomination d’un superviseur. 
(b) Dans une procédure du « débiteur non dessaisi » sans la surveillance d’un 
superviseur, le tribunal est appelé à jouer un rôle plus actif. 
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Confidentialité 
(a) Une procédure confidentielle ne peut être gardée confidentielle que si (i) elle 
n’a aucune conséquence préjudiciable vis-à-vis des créanciers ou (ii) 
concernant les créanciers lésés entre autres par une suspension spécifique, 
la procédure est rendue publique.  
(b) Les décisions concernant l’ouverture d’une procédure du « débiteur non 
dessaisi » sont généralement publiques, même si certains éléments du plan 
de restructuration peuvent rester confidentiels. 
Coûts et durée 
(a) Les frais d’une procédure confidentielle varient considérablement. La 
procédure en elle-même est rapide ou peut être soumise à des limites de 
temps. 
(b) Dans une procédure publique de pré-insolvabilité, les frais de justice sont 
très faibles dans de nombreux États membres, en particulier en Europe de 
l’Est, tandis que les frais d’avocats pour l’assistance au débiteur ou aux 
créanciers peuvent varier considérablement. La durée des procédures 
provisoires varie considérablement, de 2 mois à 8-12 mois alors que les 
procédures publiques de pré-insolvabilité ayant pour objectif de parvenir à 
un accord avec les créanciers sont généralement plus rapides. 
(c) La procédure du « débiteur non dessaisi » est plutôt rapide et simplifiée, 
mais il est fait état de coûts élevés. 
(d) La longueur de la procédure formelle d’insolvabilité varie considérablement. 
Elle dure en moyenne deux à trois ans dans un grand nombre d’États 
membres.  
Incitations et succès 
(a) Les procédures confidentielles ne permettent pas, le plus souvent, 
l’annulation des transactions qui ont eu lieu au cours de cette procédure 
caractérisée par la confidentialité. Il est difficile de tirer des conclusions sur 
le succès de ces procédures à partir de données statistiques. 
(b) En ce qui concerne les procédures publiques de pré-insolvabilité, une 
ouverture anticipée est encouragée dans plusieurs États membres sous 
peine de sanctions civiles et/ou pénales. Le succès de ces procédures 
dépend de leur champ d’application. 
Recommandations pour des procédures préventives de pré-insolvabilité 
 
Procédures confidentielles 
La confidentialité peut réduire le risque de voir la pérennisation de l’entreprise 
menacée si sa valeur diminue en raison du discrédit imputable à l’insolvabilité. De 
par leur nature, ces procédures ne peuvent porter atteinte aux droits des créanciers 
qui ne sont pas informés de la procédure, mais lorsqu’une suspension, un moratoire 
ou un privilège sont mis en place au cours de ces procédures, elles ont une 
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meilleure chance de succès. Il convient de se demander si le pouvoir d’ordonner 
une telle suspension doit inclure une suspension des poursuites du créancier contre 
des tiers débiteurs solidaires et garants. La possibilité d’avoir un plan de 
restructuration voté par les créanciers retenus uniquement et susceptible d’être 
imposé à la minorité de dissidents peut également être un outil important. D’autres 
outils importants peuvent être le moratoire ordonné par un tribunal à l’égard de 
créanciers spécifiques, la possibilité d’accorder un privilège aux nouveaux 
financements et la protection contre les mesures d’annulation de transactions qui 
ont été conclues dans le cadre d’une procédure confidentielle avec le consentement 
d’un superviseur nommé par un tribunal ou du tribunal lui-même. 
 
Il convient de classer les procédures confidentielles de pré-insolvabilité comme des 
procédures relevant du Règlement révisé relatif aux procédures d’insolvabilité, 
ouvertes au centre des intérêts principaux du débiteur. Deux problèmes se posent à 
cet égard : (i) une telle détermination du centre des intérêts principaux par le 
tribunal doit être susceptible de recours par les parties intéressées. Toutefois, les 
créanciers peuvent ne pas être au courant de l’ouverture d’une procédure 
confidentielle ou peuvent en être informés à des moments différents. (ii) La 
détermination du centre des intérêts principaux couvre la durée de la procédure 
confidentielle et n’exclut pas une autre détermination du centre des intérêts 
principaux par un tribunal d’un autre État membre dans le cadre de l’ouverture 
d'autres procédures publiques de pré-insolvabilité ou de procédures d’insolvabilité 
formelle. Dans ce cas, les décisions prises au cours des procédures confidentielles 
et les conséquences de ces procédures devraient conserver leurs effets. 
 
Les procédures publiques de pré-insolvabilité peuvent permettre de faire des 
économies de coûts, car elles peuvent être ouvertes avant la réalisation d’un test 
d’insolvabilité. Elles peuvent également permettre l’institution d’un type de 
procédures contrôlées par le créancier, ce qui peut également réduire les coûts. 
 
Nous ne voyons pas de moyens visant spécifiquement à réduire les coûts. 
 
Dans la mesure où les procédures d’insolvabilité sont perçues comme longues, la 
durée peut être réduite en imposant la mise sous séquestre de fonds pour les 
créanciers susceptibles de revendiquer un traitement injuste. 
 
Procédure du débiteur non dessaisi 
Les procédures du « débiteur non dessaisi » sont attrayantes, car elles permettent 
au débiteur de conserver le contrôle de leurs affaires, bien que sous une certaine 
supervision. Cependant, ces procédures peuvent être assez coûteuses, du fait 
qu’elles nécessitent en général la nomination d’un chef de restructuration 
expérimenté ou l’intervention d’un tribunal à un niveau beaucoup plus élevé que la 
procédure dans laquelle un syndic de faillite indépendant est nommé. Un tel niveau 
d’intervention d’un tribunal peut être difficile à atteindre dans certains États 
membres. 
 
Cram down 
Le sauvetage d’entreprises peut être réalisé par l’adoption de plans de 
restructuration dans lesquels tous les créanciers (y compris les créanciers titulaires 
d’une sûreté), y sont soumis, sous réserve qu’une majorité qualifiée de créanciers 
ayant des intérêts parallèles vote en faveur de ce plan. Les plans de restructuration 
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doivent au minimum prévoir l’obligation que les créanciers reçoivent, en vertu du 
plan, la valeur minimale qu’ils recevraient en l’absence d’un tel plan. En outre, il 
devrait être possible d’avoir des plans de restructuration limités impliquant 
uniquement des créanciers spécifiques et pouvant être adoptés dans le cadre de 
procédures confidentielles. Ces plans limités devraient prévoir des règles de vote et 
de cram down similaires. 
 
Suspension des poursuites 
Les tribunaux devraient avoir la possibilité d’ordonner la suspension temporaire de 
la restructuration contre l’ensemble ou certains des créanciers. Un moratoire peut 
être nécessaire pour éviter que les créanciers menacent de faire échouer le 
sauvetage de l’entreprise s’ils ne perçoivent pas plus que leur juste part. 
 
Nouveaux financements 
La possibilité d’attirer de nouveaux fonds pendant la procédure d’insolvabilité ou la 
procédure de pré-insolvabilité est cruciale pour le succès d’une opération de 
restructuration. Les nouveaux prêteurs doivent bénéficier d’une sorte de 
classement des priorités et de protection contre les mesures d’annulation ou la 
subordination. 
 
La procédure de pré-insolvabilité et l’annulation 
Afin de permettre à la procédure de pré-insolvabilité d’aboutir à un sauvetage 
réussi, des paiements réguliers doivent être versés aux principaux créanciers et de 
nouvelles transactions doivent être conclues, et parfois impliquer la vente d’une 
partie des actifs. Ces transactions doivent être protégées lors des futures 
procédures formelles d’insolvabilité, à condition d’avoir été examinées par le 
superviseur ou le tribunal. 
 
Mesures de soutien 
Afin d’assurer l’efficacité d’un mécanisme de restructuration précoce, il est impératif 
de mettre en œuvre des mesures garantissant que les activités commerciales du 
débiteur peuvent se poursuivre sans entrave. Il est impératif de rejeter les 
prétentions des créanciers de mettre fin à des contrats ou de demander des 
modifications aux contrats existants uniquement sur la base du fait que le débiteur 
fait usage d’un mécanisme de restructuration, bien que le débiteur respecte toutes 
ses obligations contractuelles. En outre, il conviendrait également de rejeter toute 
obligation contractuelle d’informer l’autre partie de l’ouverture d'une procédure 
confidentielle. 
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3. DIFFERENT KINDS OF INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS 
In the Commission’s preparatory documents pre-insolvency proceedings are 
referred to as “structured procedures (both in-court and out-of-court) which allow 
the debtor to address his financial difficulties with his creditors at an early stage 
before an obligation to file for insolvency under national law is triggered.” Such 
definition poses a problem because in several jurisdictions there is no obligation to 
file for insolvency. Therefore another useful categorization had to be identified. In 
doing so we observed the following considerations: 
 
(a)  Rescue of businesses typically follows one of the following scenarios (i) a 
settlement agreed upon between the debtor and the creditors with no 
involvement of the court at all2 (“out-of-court settlement”) (ii) a rescue plan 
adopted by the creditors and/or established by the court in some kind of 
formal proceedings in which special rules apply (“rescue plan”) (iii) 
continuation of the business after a sale of the assets to a new legal entity 
(“sale”). Although scenario (iii) does not usually save the debtor-company it 
does save the business or part thereof including contracts with suppliers 
and/or employment and it should therefore be considered a rescue scenario. 
Economically scenario (iii) often amounts to the same as scenario (ii) 
although the applicable proceedings and the treatment in statistics may be 
quite different; 
(b) Rescue of businesses may effectively take place in very different 
proceedings including full insolvency proceedings aimed at liquidation. 
However, insolvency proceedings which are often published quickly impair 
the chance of success of rescue and the value of the business. For that 
reason finding, negotiating and procuring solutions outside of or prior to the 
opening of such public proceedings may be crucial.  
(c) There is a great variety of cases in which (pre-) insolvency proceedings are 
opened. This applies to the sizes of the companies, the markets and so on. 
Therefore statistics are often not very meaningful. Even if a small number of 
businesses can be rescued, such rescue can still have a significant meaning 
on a macro-economic scale. Furthermore we consider it a fact of capitalist 
society that many businesses that find themselves unable to cope with their 
financial problems cannot be saved by some kind of proceedings and 
sometimes it is not prudent to artificially sustain the weakest businesses, 
sometimes to the detriment of their competitors. Survival of the fittest in 
business ensures a healthier breed. Nevertheless there are situations in 
which rescue can avoid unnecessary destruction and in those cases the 
availability of adequate rescue proceedings and measures at an early stage 
may be crucial. 
(d) Since the Member States use different criteria for “insolvency" it is not 
useful to distinguish proceedings as to whether the debtor is insolvent. A 
                                                 
2  Not even protection against applications seeking the opening of formal insolvency 
proceedings during the negotiations. 
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situation which may be perceived as insolvency in one Member State may be 
seen as mere financial difficulty in another Member State. However an 
important distinguishing feature between proceedings is that in some 
proceedings a requirement for opening is that it has been established prior 
to opening that a certain stage of financial difficulty has been reached 
(usually designated as “insolvency”) whereas other proceedings are opened 
without such a test. In the latter type of proceedings often an official is 
appointed to investigate whether the debtor is indeed insolvent. 
(e) In this study we have not considered out-of-court settlements, referred to as 
scenario (i). These informal settlements do not require the opening of 
proceedings or any court involvement and are generally considered to be 
based upon contract law or corporate law. 
In view of the above we have made the following classification: 
 
Pre-insolvency proceedings are proceedings which are opened because the debtor 
is in financial difficulties but without any prior insolvency test. They involve the 
applicability of special rules of insolvency law, e.g. certain transactions may require 
consent by the court or a bankruptcy trustee or certain creditors may be stayed. 
After determination that the debtor is indeed insolvent under the national standards 
pre-insolvency proceedings are converted into full insolvency proceedings. 
Essentially there are two types of pre-insolvency proceedings: (a) confidential 
proceedings and (b) proceedings which require some kind of publicity. The latter 
type is referred to as public pre-insolvency proceedings. Pre-insolvency proceedings 
do not necessarily result in full insolvency proceedings. They may aim at and 
achieve a rescue solution which precludes the necessity to open full insolvency 
proceedings. 
 
So-called “debtor-in-possession" proceedings are proceedings in which the debtor 
himself administers the estate under supervision of the court with or without the 
appointment of a supervisor. In confidential proceedings the rule is that the debtor 
stays in possession (just like in out of court settlements) and we have therefore 
limited the use of the term "debtor in possession proceedings" to public pre-
insolvency proceedings and full insolvency proceedings in which the debtor himself 
administers the estate. They may involve some form of continuation of the business 
as well as winding up thereof. Although debtor-in-possession proceedings are not 
typically pre-insolvency proceedings, they were nevertheless included in our study, 
because debtor-in possession proceedings are often seen as an avenue towards 
rescue. The main attractive feature of debtor-in-possession proceedings from the 
perspective of those who plan the insolvency proceedings is that there is no 
transfer of control to an unknown entity at the inception of the proceedings. This 
may help to carry out a rescue strategy that was adopted prior to the opening of 
the proceedings. 
 
3.1 Confidential proceedings 
 
Typically the following types of proceedings can be distinguished: 
 
i. Proceedings in which the debtor tries to reach agreement with the creditors. 
An expert or insolvency practitioner is usually appointed to assist the debtor 
but there are no means to force any creditors to accept a reduction or 
modification of their claims or a standstill period. However these proceedings 
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usually involve protection against applications for the opening of public pre-
insolvency proceedings or full insolvency proceedings. Furthermore in 
proceedings of this kind no restructuring plan can be established in which a 
dissenting minority is bound by a majority subject to confirmation by the 
court. The debtor stays in full control of his estate. New debts entered into 
by the debtors do not enjoy advanced ranking in subsequent insolvency 
proceedings. However, transactions performed according to the agreed plan 
may not be set aside in case of subsequent opening of full insolvency 
proceedings. 
ii. Proceedings as under (i) but with the additional features that the court can 
order a stay of enforcement of certain debts or can order modification of 
debts such as postponement of their due date. Some decisions may need 
the consent of a court appointed trustee3. In some Member States secured 
creditors cannot be stayed4. The proceedings can also involve a decision that 
debts incurred under these pre-insolvency proceedings enjoy advanced 
ranking in subsequent insolvency proceedings. Often decisions involving 
these additional features will entail publicity. These proceedings may not 
entail the adoption of a regular rescue plan which involves voting and 
confirmation but they may serve as preparation for such rescue plan5. In 
such case the plan proceedings are not confidential.  
iii. Proceedings as under (ii) but with the possibility to adopt a rescue plan 
involving a vote by the creditors involved and binding upon such creditors. 
The court may subsequently cram down other creditors, including those that 
were not involved in the negotiations6. Sometimes secured creditors are 
exempt from such cram down (which makes these proceedings less 
effective). 
Confidential procedures are available in several Member States7 (as illustrated 
overleaf). Most of the confidential proceedings are fairly recent dating from the last 
20 years. 
 
                                                 
3   Germany. 
4  Denmark, Latvia. 
5  France, Germany, Denmark. 
6  Portugal. 
7  Not in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, England, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden. 
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3.2 Public pre-insolvency proceedings  
 
Public pre-insolvency proceedings are proceedings in which a supervisor / 
administrator / liquidator is appointed or which take place under the supervision of 
a court and which are opened without an insolvency test. They are to be 
distinguished from confidential proceedings in that the opening of these 
proceedings is published in a public register or in the papers and that they are 
therefore not confidential. 
 
Two types of public pre-insolvency proceedings can be distinguished: 
 
i. Public pre-insolvency proceedings may serve as a first phase of insolvency 
proceedings which serves the goal of assessing the requirements for opening 
full proceedings. After this preliminary phase, if all the conditions are met, 
full insolvency proceedings are opened, which continue with the filing and 
admission of claims8 and either restructuring or sale of the assets9. This kind 
of public pre-insolvency proceedings will be referred to as “interim 
proceedings”. However, in some countries interim proceedings may also lead 
to restructuring or recovery without the opening of full insolvency 
proceedings10. The insolvency plan (or the restructuring plan were available) 
has to be approved by the court, that usually controls that formalities have 
been respected, the necessary majorities have approved it, creditors have 
been regularly represented and equally treated. In some Member States the 
court also checks if the plan has some chance of success. 
ii. Public pre-insolvency proceedings may also be designed as a means to 
reaching an agreement with creditors. In some Member States the attempt 
to enter into an agreement with creditors aimed at restructuring qualifies as 
preliminary phase under local law. In case of failure, full insolvency 
proceedings are opened11. The debtor may remain in possession, but an 
administrator is appointed by the court12. The meetings with the creditors 
may be convened by the court13. The agreement has to be approved by 
                                                 
8  Bulgaria, Lithuania (in Estonia the list of assets and debts is part of the interim phase). 
9  Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Italy (concordato con riserva, in view of opening a 
concordato preventivo), Poland. In Hungary liquidation proceedings are the only 
insolvency proceedings that are widely used. 
10  Croatia, Germany, Malta (as per Article 329B Companies Act), Poland. 
11  Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France (sauvegarde and sauvegarde financière 
accélérée), Italy (concordato con riserva in view of validating accordi di ristrutturazione), 
Malta (scheme of compromise or arrangement in the context of company recovery 
proceeding), Portugal (if the debtor is in an insolvency situation at the closing of the 
interim proceedings), Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain (Acuerdo Extrajudicial de Pagos), UK 
(CVAs). 
12  Denmark (supervisor, who is responsible for preparing the business plan), France 
(sauvegarde and sauvegarde financière accélérée), Ireland (examiner, who is in charge 
of preparing the scheme of arrangement and may ask for directors’ powers to be 
transferred to him), Italy, UK (CVAs), Malta (provisional administrator may be appointed 
by the Court but this does not, of itself, relieve directors from their duties), Portugal 
(interim judicial administrator), Slovakia (compulsory settlement administrator) and 
Slovenia. Under the law of Cyprus if a receiver is appointed the debtor does not remain 
in possession and the proceedings last longer). Under English law, in case of 
administration the debtor is divested. 
13  Cyprus, UK (CVAs). 
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variable majorities of creditors14, but after approval or confirmation by the 
court it binds all creditors15. As these are public pre-insolvency proceedings 
the plan may be accepted by the creditors without an insolvency test. 
However in virtually all systems a creditor opposing the plan may seek 
refusal of the court to confirm the plan, on the basis that the debtor is not 
insolvent or the court may apply such test regardless whether a creditor 
seeks such refusal16. 
Public pre-insolvency proceedings are not available in several Member States17. In 
the majority of the Member States public pre-insolvency proceedings are regulated 
in the insolvency code or act18 or in a special statute19. Only in a few Member 
States the relevant provisions are part of company law20.  
 
3.3 Debtor-in-possession proceedings (DIP) 
 
Debtor in possession proceedings are public pre-insolvency proceedings or full 
insolvency proceedings in which the debtor is not divested of the assets but 
administers his assets under supervision by a court or a court appointed supervisor. 
 
The laws of several Member States offer independent proceedings where the debtor 
remains in possession of the business, that are designed to avoid bankruptcy and 
facilitate restructuring21. In some countries DIP have been enacted many years 
ago22, while in some other Member States they are fairly recent. The assessment of 
the use and success of DIP varies among the Member States: in some countries 
                                                 
14  Cyprus (75%), Denmark (50%+1), Italy (60% for accordi di ristrutturazione), Malta 
(75%, by classes), Portugal (66,66%+1 of total claims + 50%+1 of non-subordinated 
claims), Slovenia (60%), UK (CVAs 75%), Slovenia (60%), Spain (60% or 75% if the 
agreement entails that the secured creditor has to accept ownership of the secured asset 
against reduction of his claim). 
15  Cyprus, Ireland (by classes), Denmark, Italy (in concordato preventivo proceedings, 
while accordi di ristrutturazione only bind creditors who agreed), Malta (scheme of 
compromise or arrangement), Portugal, Slovenia (for unsecured creditors), UK (but CVAs 
do not require approval by the court), Spain (acuerdo extrajudicial de pagos). Under 
Croatian law, the agreement is approved by FINA and concluded in court. 
16  Usually the test is whether the creditor would receive better value if the plan were not 
adopted. If the debtor is solvent the creditor would receive full value of his claim which 
defeats his discounted claim under the plan. 
17  Belgium, Finland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, Spain, Sweden. 
18  Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, 
Slovenia, UK (CVA, Administration). 
19  Croatia. 
20  Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, UK (schemes of arrangement). 
21  Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany (self-administration), Greece, Hungary, Italy 
(concordato preventivo), Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Spain (if filing for 
voluntary insolvency is made by the debtor, but the court may exceptionally divest the 
debtor also in this case or leave the debtor in possession even in involuntary insolvency), 
Sweden. No DIP are reported in Cyprus, Estonia, Malta and the Netherlands. 
22  Austria (in 1915, Ausgleich), Belgium (but 1997 was replaced in 2009), Germany (1999, 
modified 2012), Italy (in 1942, substantially modified starting 2005), Lithuania 2001, 
Luxembourg (since 1935), Sweden (since 1996). 
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they are used regularly23 and are successful24, in other countries they are seldom 
used25. Statistics are rather rare. 
 
Independent DIP is not the only model that can be found in the Member States’ 
legal systems. Some Member States that follow model (i) above for public pre-
insolvency proceedings do provide that the debtor may remain in possession also 
after the opening of full insolvency proceedings and/or for some of the stages 
thereof26.  
 
In some countries the only DIP are the public pre-insolvency proceedings described 
above (model (ii))27. Independent DIP may consist of out of court negotiations and 
possibly voting on a plan followed by court approval or formal reorganisation 
proceedings.  
 
Several models can be followed, which may be alternative to one another: 
 
(a)  a reorganisation plan voted on by the creditors and confirmed by the court, 
sometimes accompanied by a short moratorium; 
(b) a moratorium ending with an agreement, that may be carried out under the 
supervision of the court and implies a stay of enforcement for claims 
covered by the agreement, which provides effects if the company complies 
with the collective agreement. 
If these scenarios fail, the proceedings may end up in a reorganisation through 
sales ordered by the court under a judicial administrator28. 
 
                                                 
23  In Austria the amount has declined considerably in recent decades, from 50% of all 
proceedings to 5% in 2012: they are used frequently in Belgium, Italy, Spain and 
Sweden. 
24  Austria only 15% re-application in 10 years (this figure relates to restructurings under 
full insolvency proceedings), Finland (more successful for bigger firms). 
25  Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg. 
26  Bulgaria (first phase after opening is dedicated to an attempt to restructure), Czech 
Republic (after moratorium), Germany (preliminary insolvency proceedings, see Q1), 
Poland (both composition bankruptcy and reorganisation have a DIP option), Romania. 
27  Denmark, France, Ireland, Portugal (PER), UK (CVA). 
28  Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain (if the composition agreement is not approved or no 
composition agreement is presented by the debtor or the creditors). 
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3.4 Full proceedings (not DIP) 
 
Full insolvency proceedings are insolvency proceedings which are not pre-
insolvency proceedings. Leaving aside DIP proceedings, which have been discussed 
above, three types of full insolvency proceedings are mentioned: liquidation, 
reorganisation/restructuring and discharge or debt relief (clearing off of debts and 
making a fresh start) proceedings. In the full insolvency proceedings, liquidation 
proceedings have a preponderant position: in many Member States all full 
insolvency proceedings are liquidation proceedings29, whereas in some Member 
States30 there are both liquidation and restructuring proceedings.  
 
Only the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Sweden have separate debt 
discharge procedures. Many other Member States have included debt discharge 
provisions for individuals in their statutory rules with respect to full insolvency 
proceedings31. 
 
It should be emphasized that often there is an overlap between liquidation and 
restructuring. 
 
For example, in some Member States a composition plan may be adopted in 
liquidation proceedings32.  
 
In some Member States33 it is also possible to sell the business of the company 
after liquidation proceedings have been opened. On the other hand, as Professor 
Philip Wood mentions in Principles of International Insolvency34, many 
reorganisation proceedings are in fact slow motion liquidations. 
 
                                                 
29  Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia (restructuring agreement within full insolvency 
proceedings are possible, but very rare), Finland, Hungary, Ireland (corporate), Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Sweden. The larger occurrence of liquidation 
proceedings is also shown by the following figures: Slovakia: 2012: 1251 bankruptcy 
against 115 restructurings; France: 32627 liquidation proceedings opened, against 
10685 reorganisation proceedings; the Netherlands: 2013, up to 1 October: 9381 
bankruptcy as opposed to 335 reorganisation procedures; Poland: 2012: 711 liquidation 
bankruptcies versus 166 composition bankruptcies, 2011: 620 versus 103; Slovenia: 636 
full insolvency proceedings against 43 compulsory settlement proceedings. 
30  Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland. In Slovakia there 
are separate bankruptcy and separate restructuring proceedings. 
31  Malta, Ireland (corporate and individuals) and the Netherlands. 
32  Malta, Poland, the Netherlands, Spain, Ireland and Lithuania. 
33  Belgium, Ireland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and the 
Netherlands. 
34  Wood, 2-001 (p. 31). 
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4. SOME ELEMENTS OF INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS 
4.1 Commencement of proceedings 
 
In general the confidential proceedings can only be opened at the request of the 
debtor35. They usually but not always involve an opening decision by the court36. 
 
Public pre-insolvency proceedings may be started by the debtor37, or by creditors38, 
or by the liquidator39, or by national agencies or public bodies40. 
 
DIP proceedings are generally opened by the court41 upon request by the debtor 
only42 or by the debtor and creditors and a public authority or agency43. 
 
Full insolvency proceedings may be opened at the request of the debtor or a 
creditor44, or public authorities45, or in a few Member States the liquidator46. 
                                                 
35  Austria, France, Germany, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, 
Spain. In Denmark they can also be opened at the request of a creditor. 
36  Not in Italy, nor in Portugal. 
37  Bulgaria, Croatia (only), Czech Republic (only debtor may apply), Estonia, Germany 
(provisional measures), Italy, Malta (company recovery procedure), Poland, Slovenia 
(only debtor may apply), Spain (only debtor may apply). In Portugal, the debtor must 
obtain a written statement whereby the debtor and at least one of its creditors express 
their willingness to initiate negotiations. 
38  Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany (provisional measures), Malta (company recovery 
procedure), Poland. 
39  Bulgaria, Poland. 
40  Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland. 
41  Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece (opened by court, supervisor appointed by court), 
Hungary (court validation), Italy, Lithuania (opened by court, supervisor appointed by 
court), Luxembourg (a court judge is appointed to report on financial situation), Slovakia 
(approved by court), Slovenia (approved by court), Spain (supervision of insolvency 
trustee), Sweden (opened by court). 
42  Italy. 
43  May be started only by the debtor in Austria, Belgium (reorganisation plan), Germany 
(self-administration), Greece (under certain conditions also by creditors), Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Slovenia. DIP may be started by the debtor, the creditors and public 
authorities in Belgium, and by the debtor and the creditors in Finland, Slovakia, Sweden, 
Spain (although, as a general rule, if the insolvency proceedings are opened by the 
creditors, the debtor will not remain in possession). 
44  Both the debtor and creditors are mentioned by Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Spain, Sweden, UK, Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania. 
45  Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Romania. The public authorities are: Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, the 
Netherlands: in the case of banks and financial institutions or insurance undertakings, 
the supervising authority. Public Prosecutor (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Romania). National revenue agency for private state receivables 
(Bulgaria), State or municipality (public debts) (Bulgaria), Director of Corporate 
Enforcement, Registrar of Companies, Public Guarantee, Maintenance and Disability Fund 
(Slovenia). 
46  In Slovakia in bankruptcy, the liquidator (i.e. the person appointed by company 
shareholders or by court within the framework of company winding-up proceeding (which 
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The most common criteria for initiating full insolvency proceedings are the 
cessation of payments test (also called the cash flow or illiquidity test), and the 
balance sheet test. The cessation of payments, cash flow or illiquidity test requires 
that the debtor has generally ceased making payments and will not have sufficient 
cash flow to service its existing obligations as they fall due in the ordinary course of 
business. The balance sheet test concerns an excess of liabilities over assets as an 
indication of financial distress. 
 
The cessation of payments test (sometimes combined with the balance sheet test) 
is applied in almost all Member States47. 
 
4.2 Is the debtor left in possession? 
 
In confidential proceedings the debtor is always left in possession of the assets. 
Sometimes a supervisor is appointed. In this respect we do not use the term debtor 
in possession proceedings to refer to confidential proceedings, but only to public 
pre-insolvency proceedings and full insolvency proceedings in which the debtor 
remains in possession of the assets and administers the estate. 
 
In the majority of cases where the public pre-insolvency proceedings serve as 
interim proceedings an insolvency practitioner is appointed by the court48, but in 
some Member States the debtor remains in possession and the activity of the 
insolvency practitioner is limited to supervising49. Where the public pre-insolvency 
proceedings serve as a means of reaching an agreement with creditors the debtor 
may remain in possession, but an administrator is appointed by the court50. The 
meetings with the creditors may be convened by the court51. 
                                                                                                                                               
may or may not result in company going bankrupt) and charged with the sale of assets 
and satisfaction of company creditors) has to file an application within thirty days after 
establishing the debtor's over-indebtedness and Latvia mentions the administrator in 
restructuring and the liquidator in main proceedings. 
47  Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France (balance 
sheet test as the debtor’s cessation of payments (‘état de cessation des paiements’) 
describes situations where the current liabilities that are due exceed the available assets, 
that include reserve credit and moratoriums), Germany, Greece, Hungary (combined 
with the balance sheet test), Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania (with some elements of the 
balance sheet test), Luxembourg (together with creditworthiness test), Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland (combined with the balance sheet test), Romania, Portugal 
(combination with the balance sheet test), Slovakia (combination with the balance sheet 
test), Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, UK. 
48  Bulgaria (not mandatory), Croatia, Italy (not mandatory), Malta (court may appoint 
provisional administrator). Poland (not mandatory), Slovakia (not mandatory), Lithuania. 
49  Slovakia, Slovenia. Under Polish law the debtor remains in possession if a temporary 
supervisor is appointed, while he is divested if a compulsory administrator is appointed. 
Also German law distinguishes between a “light-touch” preliminary insolvency 
proceedings and a tight preliminary proceedings. Under Austrian law the debtor may be 
partially divested. Under Italian law the supervisor appointed by the court provides 
opinions on acts exceeding the ordinary course of business. 
50  Denmark (supervisor, who is responsible for preparing the business plan), France 
(sauvegarde and sauvegarde financière accélérée); Ireland (examiner, who is in charge 
of preparing the scheme of arrangement and may ask for directors’ powers to be 
transferred to him), Italy, UK (CVAs), Malta (appointment of provisional administrator 
does not necessarily terminate the role of directors), Portugal (interim judicial 
administrator), Slovakia (compulsory settlement administrator), Slovenia (compulsory 
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In DIP proceedings the debtor is not completely free to manage the company, even 
after a restructuring plan has been approved and is implemented. In the phase 
leading to the approval of the plan he may not dispose of assets, but such 
prohibition usually does not apply. Also, after the approval of the plan, he may not 
dispose of assets outside the plan52. While in some countries it is reported that the 
debtor is not subject to any influence by the court53, in the majority of cases not 
only does the court control the correct implementation of the plan, either directly or 
through an administrator/insolvency practitioner54, but it may restrict the powers of 
the debtor55 or even approve all transactions/acts56.  
 
Also the creditors may have a say on the implementation of the restructuring plan. 
They may nominate the administrator57, or ask the court to limit the powers of the 
debtor58. Creditors appear in person but are usually also organised in committees59. 
 
As far as full proceedings are concerned, DIP proceedings only occur in rescue 
proceedings and in debt relief, and not in the case of a final liquidation60. In eleven 
EU Member States61, there are DIP proceedings in full insolvency proceedings. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
settlement administrator), Spain (mediator). Under the law of Cyprus if a receiver is 
appointed the debtor does not remain in possession and the proceedings last longer). 
Under English law, in case of administration the debtor is divested. 
51  Cyprus, UK (CVAs). 
52  Lithuania, Luxembourg. 
53  Belgium, Finland. 
54  Greece (prior to the court ratification of the plan), Italy, Spain, Slovakia (only for 
extraordinary acts), Portugal. 
55  Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia. 
56  Bulgaria, France, Italy (extraordinary acts only). 
57  Bulgaria. 
58  Czech Republic. 
59  Czech Republic, Germany (creditors’ committee controls all legal transactions of material 
evidence). In Portugal, a creditors’ committee shall be appointed in the context of full 
insolvency proceedings. 
60  P.R. Wood, Principles of Insolvency Law, 2007 10-005. 
61  Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic (in reorganisation and discharge, but not in 
bankruptcy), France (in reorganisation, but not in liquidation), Germany (DIP in 
insolvency with self-administration), Greece (at the beginning of full insolvency 
proceedings, the debtor is divested of the estate, but a debtor may request for DIP), 
Ireland (Corporate) (the debtor company is not divested once it enters liquidation, but in 
voluntary and in a court liquidation, the liquidator will assume the powers of the board of 
directors); Italy (concordato preventivo aimed at liquidating the debtor’s assets), 
Romania (reorganisation proceedings); Slovakia (in restructuring proceedings and in 
debt relief), Slovenia (in restructuring proceedings and in debt relief), Spain (if the 
debtor files for voluntary insolvency, there will be DIP proceedings under the supervision 
of the receiver). 
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4.3 Stay of enforcement 
 
In confidential proceedings there cannot be a general stay of enforcement. However 
enforcement can be stayed with respect to specific creditors who are made aware 
of the confidential proceedings62. 
 
During public pre-insolvency proceedings in some Member States full stay of 
individual enforcement and pending actions apply63, while in other Member States 
only the stay of pending actions is provided64. Secured creditors are usually 
excluded from the stay65.  
 
In some Member States provisional measures to secure the assets may be or have 
to be adopted by the court, depending upon the applicant66. Also where the public 
pre-insolvency proceedings serve as a means to reach an agreement with the 
creditors full stay of individual enforcement actions and of pending actions is set 
forth by the law67.  
 
                                                 
62  France (pursuant to the Civil Code, Article 1244-1), Hungary, Portugal (the opening of 
confidential proceedings bars the commencement of any enforcement proceedings 
against the debtor or of any other proceedings for the payment of pecuniary obligations 
and stays those pending as long as the proceedings are not terminated, except in 
relation to creditors that have expressed their unwillingness to take part therein). 
63  Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany (stay of enforcement proceedings is ordered by the court, 
while stay of pending actions is ordered in tight proceedings only), Hungary (but the stay 
of pending actions has to be requested by the debtor), Italy, Malta (224(2) Companies 
Act re provisional administrator; Article 329B Companies Act re company recovery 
procedure), Poland (to be asked by the debtor), Portugal (the opening of interim 
proceedings bars the commencement of any debt collection proceedings against the 
debtor and, while the negotiations are pending, stays any proceedings for such purpose 
against the debtor). 
64  Estonia. In Austria no stay is provided. 
65  They are included in England (administration), Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
Slovenia. In Belgium, during pre-insolvency proceedings the enforcement by secured 
creditors with a security on a determined good can be stayed but the amount of the 
claim cannot be crammed down. Those claims can only be spread in the time to be paid. 
In Denmark some security holders can be stayed. 
66  Bulgaria, Germany, Lithuania, Poland. Under Austrian law provisional measures may be 
disposed by the court upon request of the creditors. 
67  Cyprus, Denmark (only for new claims), France (sauvegarde and sauvegarde financière 
accélérée), Ireland, Malta, Portugal (as mentioned above), Slovakia, Slovenia. Under 
Italian and English law (CVAs) stay has to be requested by the debtor. 
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In full insolvency proceedings, there is an automatic stay in almost all Member 
States68, sometimes with exceptions for certain proceedings69. In a substantial 
number of Member States70, secured creditors can still enforce their claims; in 
other Member States71 no enforcement is possible for this group of creditors.  
 
In most Member States72, attachments are lifted after the start of full insolvency 
proceedings. Also in most Member States73, there is a stay on general legal 
proceedings that are pending when the insolvency proceedings are opened.  
 
4.4 Cram down on dissenting creditors 
 
In this report cram-down is defined as the overriding of the votes of creditors who 
vote against the reorganisation plan.  
 
In confidential proceedings restructuring plans involving voting and cram down are 
rare and anyway limited to the creditors involved74. 
 
A composition in public pre-insolvency proceedings has to be approved by variable 
majorities of creditors75, but after approval or confirmation by the court it binds all 
creditors76. 
 
                                                 
68  Except Spain and Malta. In the latter country in the case of bankruptcy of traders (i.e. 
not companies) there is no stay, as Article 484 of the Commercial Code states that 
during bankruptcy, precautionary and conservatory acts may be sued out by the 
creditors against the curators of the bankrupt. In the case of Maltese insolvency of 
companies there is no complete stay: once a winding up order has been issued, the court 
has to give leave if a creditor wants to take action against the company or its property. 
69  The following countries answer that there is an automatic stay with exceptions: Bulgaria, 
Cyprus (after a winding up order has been made or a provisional liquidator has been 
appointed), Estonia, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden and UK. 
70  Belgium (holders of security rights in rem can enforce their claims), Czech Republic 
(secured claims should be satisfied from the selling of the respective security), Finland, 
Germany (that is, titles secured on real estate), Ireland, Italy (financial institutions that 
entered into certain secured loans with the debtor), Latvia (that is, after two months 
after the declaration of insolvency), Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland (in 
composition bankruptcy), Romania (but only after permission of the syndic judge), Spain 
(but only after certain conditions are met), Sweden. 
71  Cyprus, Denmark, France, Greece (that is, execution measures by secured creditors on 
the debtor’s assets used for business activities), Hungary, Italy, Poland (in liquidation 
bankruptcy), Portugal, Slovakia, UK. 
72  Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain. 
73  Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, 
UK. On the other hand, in the case of Spain, it is very striking that (with some 
exceptions) pending legal proceedings are not interrupted after the opening of insolvency 
proceedings. 
74  Portugal. 
75  Cyprus (75%), Denmark (50%+1), Italy (50%+1 for concordato preventivo, 60% for 
accordi di ristrutturazione), Portugal (66%), Slovenia (60%), Spain (60% or 75% if the 
agreement entails that the secured creditor has to accept ownership of the secured asset 
against reduction of his claim), UK (CVA 75%). 
76  Cyprus, Ireland (by classes), Denmark, Italy (only concordato preventivo), Slovenia, 
Spain (Acuerdo Extrajudicial de Pagos), UK (but CVAs do not require approval by the 
court). Under Croatian law, the agreement is approved by FINA and concluded in court. 
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In many countries DIP proceedings require that a restructuring plan be submitted 
to the court by the debtor, by certain creditors, by the shareholders or by an 
administrator77. The plan may involve all creditors78 or only classes of creditors79. 
The majorities for the approval of the plan vary from one Member State to the 
other80. The plan may bind all creditors, irrespective of their approval81. The plan is 
subject to approval by the court82, which may carry out only a formal control in 
respect of procedural rules83 or alternatively play a more substantive role and may 
check the soundness of the plan84. 
 
In full insolvency proceedings, a composition or recovery plan also has to be 
approved by variable majorities of creditors85, but after approval or confirmation by 
the court it binds all creditors86. 
 
                                                 
77  Austria (by the debtor), Belgium (by the debtor), Finland (drafted by administrator or 
submitted by the debtor, or by qualified shareholders, qualified secured creditors or 
qualified creditors), Germany ( all parties mentioned could submit a restructuring plan, 
however predominantly the debtor or the shareholder do so), Greece, Hungary (by the 
debtor), Italy (by the debtor), Lithuania (prepared by debtor), Luxembourg (prepared by 
the administrator/commissaire), Sweden (reorganisation plan submitted by 
reorganisation administrator upon consultation with the debtor, public composition to be 
voted by creditors and approved by court), Slovakia (restructuring plan to be 
accompanied by the opinion drafted by a restructuring administrator, approved by 
creditors and by the court), Slovenia (by the debtor), Spain (composition agreement). 
78  Austria (all unsecured creditors), Belgium, Germany, Italy (concordato preventivo). 
79  Italy (accordi di ristrutturazione), Germany, Spain (only ordinary and subordinated 
creditors, unless privilege creditors expressly accept to be bound by the composition 
agreement). 
80  Belgium (50%+1 in terms of value of claims + 50%+1 in terms of number of creditors), 
Finland (50%+1 of group + 50%+1 of total claims, but exceptions are possible), 
Germany (50%+1 of groups, approval of the group requires 50%+1 by amounts and 
heads), Greece (60% of all claims, including 40% of secured claims), Hungary (66%), 
Italy (50%+1, if classes are set up, also the majority of classes), Portugal (66,66% + 1 
of total claims + 50% + 1 of non-subordinated claims), Slovenia (60%), Spain (half of 
the ordinary creditors), Sweden (60% of unsecured creditors if they receive >50% of 
their claims, 75% if they receive <50%). 
81  Belgium, Germany, Italy (only concordato preventivo), Portugal, Spain (binding for all 
ordinary and subordinated creditors, it binds secured creditors only if they approve it). 
82  Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Slovenia. 
83  Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Spain. 
84  Luxembourg, Romania. 
85  France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Hungary, Luxembourg, Belgium, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden. See Restructuring & Insolvency 2013 
(http://gettingthedealthrough.com/) and Clifford Chance European Insolvency 
Procedures 2012 (http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/ 
publications/2012/05/european_insolvencyprocedures2012edition.html). 
86  France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Hungary, Luxembourg, Belgium, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden. See the literature mentioned in the preceding footnote. 
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4.5 New finance 
 
Granting superpriority to new financing in confidential proceedings is exceptional. 
In general, in interim proceedings no superpriority is granted to new financing87 
however in public pre-insolvency proceedings which serve as a means to reaching 
an agreement with creditors superpriority is sometimes granted to new financing88. 
In DIP proceedings which are full insolvency proceedings superpriority is the rule. 
 
In non-DIP full insolvency proceedings superpriority is very often granted89. 
 
4.6 Court involvement 
 
The proceedings discussed here generally require an opening decision by the court 
in some Member States. Apart from that, court involvement is usually rather limited 
in confidential proceedings, because the decisions that may prejudice the interests 
of groups of creditors are few. In public pre-insolvency proceedings and full 
insolvency proceedings which involve the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee or 
some kind of supervisor, the court involvement also tends to be limited, because in 
those cases there is little need for the court to supervise. Obviously in debtor in 
possession proceedings without supervision by a supervisor the court has to play 
another role which entails much more involvement. Furthermore, courts are almost 
always involved in the context of adoption of the confirmation of rescue plans. 
 
Where the court is involved all Member States mention court validation as a 
requirement to open full insolvency proceedings. 
 
4.7 Confidentiality 
 
Confidentiality has been made a distinctive criterion for confidential proceedings on 
the one hand and public pre-insolvency proceedings and full proceedings on the 
other hand. Because of its effects in respect of third parties, the starting point is 
                                                 
87  Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland. Under Austrian law 
superpriority for new financing in interim proceedings is not provided by the law but 
granting of collateral for new financing would be possible. Under German law superiority 
of new financing is possible. In Portugal, the creditors may agree in granting security in 
relation to new financing. 
88  Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark (if agreed by supervisor), France (conciliation 
proceedings), Germany, Ireland (if certified by examiner), the Netherlands, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain (where fresh money granted in the framework of a refinancing 
agreement meeting certain conditions will have the following priority: 50% will be 
considered as a post-insolvency creditor credit against the insolvency estate (“crédito 
contra la masa”) and the other 50% will be a credit with general privilege (“crédito con 
privilegio general”)). 
89  Belgium, Czech Republic (if a credit is made to the creditor after approval of the 
reorganisation and the lender who made the credit is not a secured creditor, the 
receivables of that lender rank pari passu with the receivables of the secured creditor), 
Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, France (under the redressement 
judiciaire, creditors after the opening judgment rank ahead of existing secured creditors 
and tax claims, but after employee claims and the insolvency expenses), Germany, UK 
(new security granted to secure new credit can only take priority over pre-existing 
security if this is permitted under the terms of the pre-existing security), Greece, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Portugal. See the literature mentioned in footnote 87 and Wood, 
Principles of International Insolvency (pp. 718-723). 
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that insolvency proceedings need to be made public. Confidential proceedings can 
only be kept confidential provided (i) there are no prejudicial effects to creditors or 
(ii) with respect to creditors who are affected by e.g. a specific stay, the 
proceedings are disclosed. The decisions opening DIP proceedings are usually 
public90, even if some elements of the restructuring plan may remain confidential. 
 
Full insolvency proceedings are also usually public. 
 
4.8 Costs and length 
 
The expenses of confidential proceedings vary considerably and many respondents 
were not able to give a general estimate. In public pre-insolvency proceedings court 
costs are very low in many Member States, in particular in Eastern Europe, while 
the lawyers’ fees for assisting the debtor or the creditors may vary considerably. 
The courts control the costs of the insolvency practitioner/administrator, which thus 
may be rather low. In certain countries, however, the amount of their fees is 
determined as a percentage of the turnover of the debtor or of the value of the 
assets, or depends upon the activities to be carried out. It may also be determined 
based on hourly fees. 
 
With respect to confidential proceedings, fast track proceedings are the exception, 
but in general the proceedings are fast in themselves91 or may be subject to time 
limits92. The duration of interim proceedings varies considerably, from two months 
to 8-12 months93. Public pre-insolvency proceedings as a means to reaching an 
agreement with the creditors are usually quite fast, they may last between a few 
weeks and a few months94. In some Member States there are fast track 
proceedings for SME's95 or fast track DIP proceedings96, but no fast track DIP 
proceedings are offered in the majority of the Member States since this type of 
proceedings is rather swift and simplified97.  
 
In some Member States the amount of the liquidator's fees in full proceedings is 
determined as a percentage of the turnover of the debtor or of the value of the 
                                                 
90  Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Finland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain. 
91  Austria (2-4 months, but this type of proceedings is not used any more), France (3 
months, but renewable, as the law does not provide any time limits for the Mandate ad 
hoc), Luxembourg (3-12 months), Spain (4 months). 
92  France (mediator maximum 4 months, renewable for one month for Conciliation 
proceedings), Germany, Portugal (3-4 months). 
93  Bulgaria (8-12 months), Estonia (2 months), Germany (3 months), Hungary (2 months), 
Italy (2-4 months, renewable once), Poland (2 months), Slovakia (3m). 
94  Croatia (4 months), Cyprus (few weeks), Czech Republic (4 months), Denmark (6 
months, +2+2), France (6-18 months sauvegarde, 2 months sauvegarde financière 
accélérée), Ireland (70-100 days), Italy (6 months), Portugal (2-3 months), UK (8 weeks 
CVA, 12-18 months administration). 
95  Croatia, Spain. 
96  Slovenia. No insolvency practitioner is appointed but the agreement has to be submitted 
to the court within 4 months for validation, after being approved by a majority of 
unsecured creditors. 
97  Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Luxembourg 
(value of the assets sold by the receiver), Poland. In Belgium the out-of-court 
proceedings involving a mediator may offer a faster option. 
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assets98, or depends upon the activities to be carried out. It may also be 
determined on the basis of hourly fees99. 
 
The length of full insolvency proceedings varies considerably in most Member 
States: in a large number100 of States the average length is two to three years. 
 
In twelve Member States101 there are fast-track/expedited full insolvency 
proceedings. In only two countries (Czech Republic102, Spain103) there are special 
rules to make full insolvency proceedings speedier, simpler and less costly for 
SME's and micro-enterprises. 
 
In seven countries104, there are provisions for maximum duration of full insolvency 
proceedings. 
 
4.9 Incentives and success  
 
An important incentive for the use of confidential proceedings may be exemption 
from voidability of transactions that have taken place during such proceedings105 as 
may be the waiver of the requirement to file for full insolvency proceedings106 and 
                                                 
98  Belgium, Czech Republic, France (liquidation proceedings), Germany, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Portugal (fixed and variable component), Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain. 
99  The Netherlands for bankruptcy and suspension of payments and Finland. They are often 
a combination of the hourly rate with other factors (Denmark): number of hours worked, 
kind of work, responsibility, financial results. 
100  Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia. 
101  Belgium; Croatia (expedited proceedings are possible if i) the debtor does not have any 
employees, ii) the debtor is illiquid and iii) no other proceedings for deletion of the 
debtor from the court registry are pending); Greece (simplified proceeding for small 
insolvencies (if the insolvency estate has a value of less than 100,000 Euros) and if ii) 
there is no immovable property in the insolvency estate); Hungary (also a simplified 
liquidation, if i) the company has no assets at all and if ii) the formal management is not 
available.); Ireland (corporate); Lithuania (under the Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy, the 
court may apply the simplified bankruptcy proceeding to the enterprise if the debtor has 
no assets or that its assets are insufficient to cover the legal and administrative 
expenses. Under the Law on Personal Bankruptcy, a simplified proceeding is also 
possible); Luxembourg; Malta; Slovakia (simplified proceedings for small bankruptcies, 
e.g. assets less than EUR 165,000); Spain (the court may apply summary proceedings 
when i) there are less than 50 creditors, ii) the liabilities do not exceed 5 million Euros 
and iii) the assets and rights are less than 5 million Euros). 
102  For non-entrepreneurs and small entrepreneurs who have less than fifty creditors and 
whose turnover was below CZK 2,000,000, there is a possibility of “minor bankruptcy”. 
103  A summary insolvency proceeding applies to SME's meeting the requirements that i) 
there are no more than 50 creditors, ii) the liabilities do not exceed 5 million euros, iii) 
the valuation of assets and rights does not reach 5 million euro. 
104  Greece (the Insolvency Code provides that after the lapse of ten years from the 
commencement of the union of creditors and fifteen years after the declaration of 
insolvency, the insolvency is brought to an end); Hungary; Ireland (individuals); Italy (if 
it is longer than 8 years, according to case law of the European Court of Human Rights, 
the Italian State may be asked to reimburse damages); Lithuania; the Netherlands; 
Romania (a reorganization plan may not exceed 3 years from its conformation date. 
However, this period may be extended once, by not more than one year). 
105  Austria, Belgium, Italy, Portugal. 
106  Belgium, Portugal, Spain. 
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protection against creditors filing for full insolvency proceedings. Of course the 
confidentiality itself may constitute an incentive107.  
 
As concerns incentives in public pre-insolvency proceedings, while there are certain 
countries where no incentives are offered108, in other countries proceedings are 
provided for encouraging early filing109. In other Member States incentives are 
construed as sanctions for late filing or breach of the duty to file for insolvency110. 
Sanctions may be civil (damages) and/or criminal. In the latter countries filing is 
mandatory. In Germany, if preliminary insolvency proceedings are commenced, it is 
possible to make use of up to three months payroll funding. 
 
As to the success of confidential proceedings it is difficult to infer an opinion from 
the statistical data we received. In some Member States confidential proceedings 
have rarely been used. In others, they have been more popular and consequently 
more successful111. In a number of instances data is not available. Moreover it is 
difficult to assess the reason for such differences. It is possible that it relates to 
certain features of the confidential proceedings, but the effectiveness of full 
insolvency proceedings may also be of importance, because confidential pre-
insolvency proceedings may be more attractive if reorganisation in full proceedings 
stands a smaller chance of success. It may also be that a requirement that the 
confidential proceedings cannot be continued if the company is actually insolvent 
may have a negative influence on the effectiveness of such proceedings. In any 
event, it seems that proceedings of type (ii) are more successful than proceedings 
of type (i), although exclusion of secured creditors from a stay or cram down may 
lessen the chance of success. 
 
As far as the assessment of the success of public pre-insolvency proceedings is 
concerned, the scope of such proceedings should be taken into account. Indeed, 
they mainly aim at securing the assets while the conditions for opening full 
insolvency proceedings are checked. Thus, public pre-insolvency proceedings 
succeed if they lead swiftly to the second phase.  
 
Where public pre-insolvency proceedings are used in order to reach an agreement 
with creditors, they are successful if the agreed plan is carried out, which 
apparently is not always the case. 
 
                                                 
107  France, the Netherlands. 
108  Austria (proceedings primarily for protecting assets for the benefit of creditors), Cyprus, 
Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
109  Belgium, Italy (protection of debtor’s assets, exemption from criminal sanctions, 
exemption in particular cases from claw-back for transactions that have taken place 
according to the plan), Portugal (stay of enforcement against the debtor, three venture 
capital funds. 
110  Bulgaria (civil and criminal sanctions), Croatia (criminal sanctions), Czech Republic 
(civil), Italy (criminal sanctions in case of late filing for full insolvency proceedings as 
well as directors’ liability), Malta (liability for wrongful trading), Poland, Portugal (civil 
and criminal sanctions for breach of the duty to file for insolvency), Slovenia (civil 
sanction), UK (wrongful trading, disqualification), Germany (civil and criminal sanctions). 
111  E.g. France and Belgium. 
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Incentives for full insolvency proceedings may consist of measures to encourage 
early filing. The incentives to encourage early filing may be negative (sanctions in 
case of late filing)112 or positive in the form of rewards113. 
 
An incentive to encourage early filing might also exist in the form of a wrongful 
trading doctrine114. 
 
Poland has an interesting phenomenon: it has a reward for the administrator in the 
form of an increase in the fees when the said insolvency proceedings are 
expeditious and offer creditors a high return, i.e. (i) when the final distribution plan 
has performed within one year from the deadline for filing claims and (ii) at least 50 
percent of the non-privileged unsecured claims are satisfied.  
 
Romania also mentions that a success fee may be granted for the diligent execution 
and implementation of a reorganisation plan. 
 
                                                 
112  Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain. As Wood (9-011) points out: if the law imposes penalties on 
management if they fail to commence proceedings, it is more difficult to achieve a 
private work-out: this is a disadvantage of this system of penalties. 
113  Austria. 
114  UK, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal. 
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5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PREVENTIVE PRE-INSOLVENCY 
PROCEEDINGS 
Confidential proceedings 
 
Confidential proceedings are developed in several Member States. A very important 
feature of such proceedings is that confidentiality may reduce the risk that the 
continuation of the business is threatened if the value is decreased as a result of 
the insolvency stigma. By nature these proceedings cannot prejudice the rights of 
creditors who are not made aware of the proceedings in any significant way. On the 
other hand from the responses it seems that confidential proceedings involving the 
possibility of a stay or standstill and advanced ranking of debts incurred during the 
pre-insolvency proceedings stand a better chance of success. It should be 
considered whether power to order such stay should include a stay of claims of the 
creditor against third parties as co-debtors and under guarantees, because in the 
absence thereof the stay against the debtor may not be very effective and the 
standstill may in fact be undermined. The possibility to have a rescue plan that is 
voted on by selected creditors (e.g. finance parties) only and which can be 
crammed down on the minority of dissenters may also provide an important tool, 
because only a limited set of creditors is involved in the negotiation and adoption of 
such a plan. Other important tools may be a court established moratorium with 
respect to specific creditors, the possibility to provide priority status to new 
financing and protection against avoidance actions of transactions which have been 
concluded in the confidential proceedings with the consent of a court appointed 
supervisor or the court itself. 
 
The confidential pre-insolvency proceedings should be categorised as proceedings 
under the revised Insolvency Regulation. They should be opened at the centre of 
main interests of the debtor. As to the consequences of the determination of the 
centre of main interests by the court opening the confidential proceedings there are 
in essence two possibilities:  
 
i. Interested parties may appeal the COMI-determination. The problem here is 
that, since the proceedings are confidential, creditors may not know of their 
opening or may hear about the confidential proceedings at different times. 
This makes it difficult to have the opening decision become irrevocable.  
ii. The determination of the centre of main interests is only for the duration of 
the confidential proceedings and does not preclude another COMI 
determination by a court in another Member State in relation to the opening 
of public pre-insolvency proceedings or full insolvency proceedings. However 
in that case the decisions taken during the confidential proceedings and the 
consequences of such proceedings should remain effective (e.g. granting of 
superpriority to new finance and possible invulnerability of transactions 
entered into or payments made during the confidential proceedings).  
Public pre-insolvency proceedings may be cost saving, because they can be 
conducted before an insolvency test has been carried out. They may also create a 
creditor controlled kind of proceedings which may save costs as well. 
We do not see means specifically aimed at reducing costs. Most Member States 
have already abolished cumbersome formalities and both sales and rescue plans 
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can be achieved in fairly little time. To the extent insolvency proceedings are 
perceived as lengthy, this may be the case because litigation has to take place or 
because fair trial requirements are to be observed. An alternative may be to deposit 
funds in escrow for creditors who may claim unfair treatment, which may enable 
the process to go ahead and which avoids litigation to entail a delay115. 
 
Debtor in possession proceedings 
 
Debtors obviously find the idea of debtor in possession proceedings attractive. It is 
however not obvious that debtor in possession proceedings result in more rescues 
or less costs. Successful debtor in possession proceedings require the appointment 
of an experienced chief restructuring officer or court involvement at a much higher 
level than proceedings in which an independent bankruptcy trustee is appointed 
and they require specialist judges. Such level of involvement may not be easily 
achievable in all Member States. Although such data are difficult to compare, there 
is an impression that debtor in possession proceedings in the United States (the 
cradle of DIP proceedings) are very expensive.  
 
Cram down 
 
Rescue of companies may be served by the adoption of rescue plans in which all 
creditors (including secured creditors) can be crammed down, provided qualified 
majorities of creditors with parallel interests vote in favour of such plan. Rescue 
plans should at least meet the requirement that the creditors receive under the 
plan at least the value that they would receive in the absence of such plan (usually 
through winding up). Moreover there should be the possibility to have limited 
rescue plans involving only specific creditors which can be adopted in confidential 
proceedings. These limited plans should contain similar voting and cram down 
rules. 
 
Stay of enforcement 
 
In the absence of statutory rules providing for a stay of enforcement the courts 
should have the ability to order a stay of enforcement for a limited time against all 
or specific creditors. A standstill may be needed to deleverage creditors who may 
threaten to blow up the rescue of the company if they do not get more than their 
fair share. 
 
New finance 
 
The possibility to attract new loans during insolvency proceedings or pre-insolvency 
proceedings is crucial for the success of a rescue operation. Often such new finance 
can only be obtained provided the new lender gets some kind of priority ranking 
and protection against avoidance actions or subordination etc. The laws should 
provide for that possibility. 
 
Pre-insolvency proceedings and avoidance 
 
In order to enable pre insolvency proceedings to result in a successful rescue often 
payments of essential creditors have to be made and new transactions have to be 
                                                 
115  This instrument is available in Germany. 
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entered into, sometimes involving the sale of part of the assets. The flexibility to 
proceed on this path would be endangered if such transactions are the object of 
avoidance actions in subsequent full insolvency proceedings. Therefore such 
transactions should be protected, provided they have been scrutinized by the 
supervisor or the court. 
 
Supporting measures 
 
In order to assure the effectiveness of an early rescue mechanism, it is imperative 
to implement measures safeguarding that trading of the debtor can continue 
unimpaired. This applies in particular to confidential proceedings. The rights of 
creditors to terminate contracts or to request changes to existing contracts solely 
based on the fact that the debtor is making use of the rescue mechanism, although 
the debtor meets all contractual obligations, must be disallowed. Furthermore any 
contractual obligation to inform the other party of the opening of confidential 
proceedings should be disallowed as well. 
  
 
